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ABSTRACT
Recently economists have begun to consider the causes and consequences of religious participation.
An unanswered question in this literature is the effect upon individuals of changes in the opportunity
cost of religious participation. In this paper we identify a policy-driven change in the opportunity
cost of religious participation based on state laws that prohibit retail activity on Sunday, known as
“blue laws.” Many states have repealed these laws in recent years, raising the opportunity cost of
religious participation. We construct a model which predicts, under fairly general conditions, that
allowing retail activity on Sundays will lower attendance levels but may increase or decrease
religious donations. We then use a variety of datasets to show that when a state repeals its blue laws
religious attendance falls, and that church donations and spending fall as well. These results do not
seem to be driven by declines in religiosity prior to the law change, nor do we see comparable
declines in membership or giving to nonreligious organizations after a state repeals its laws. We then
assess the effects of changes in these laws on drinking and drug use behavior in the NLSY. We find
that repealing blue laws leads to an increase in drinking and drug use, and that this increase is found
only among the initially religious individuals who were affected by the blue laws. The effect is
economically significant; for example, the gap in heavy drinking between religious and non religious
individuals falls by about half after the laws are repealed.
Jonathan Gruber
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  Religious service attendance is one of the most popular activities in the United States.  In a 
typical week, 20 percent of the U.S. population attends religious services, and half of the population 
attends religious services at least once per month.  Participation is widespread across all socio-economic 
groups and locations, and has remained relatively constant through time.
1 Religious organizations in the 
United States and throughout much of the world face competition from other religions, and a large 
literature has focused on the nature of religious market structure and religious competition.
2  Yet religion 
also exists in constant competition with other secular demands on individual time, from work to leisure.  
There has been little work modeling the nature of the competition between religious participation and 
other secular activities, but understanding this nexus of the secular and religious worlds is crucial for 
drawing normative conclusions about economic factors which might impinge on both. 
  In this paper, we pose a simple test of the effect of secular competition on religious participation: 
the removal of restrictions on Sunday shopping through the repeal of the so-called “blue laws.”  In many 
U.S. cities and states it was traditionally against the law to pursue commerce on Sunday, the day of 
religious observance for the vast majority of U.S. citizens.  The repeal of these laws in cities and states 
substantially increases the opportunity cost of religious attendance by offering alternatives for work, 
leisure, and consumption.   
We investigate the impact of this loosening on the constraints of the secular world as it competes 
with the religious world.  We begin by developing a model that considers an individual allocating 
temporal and monetary resources between secular and religious activities.  Initially, the presence of blue 
laws restricts individuals’ ability to pursue secular activities on Sundays.  When the laws are repealed, 
there are two possible effects.  First, time devoted to religious pursuits unambiguously falls, as 
individuals choose to devote more time to work and more secular consumption.  Second, there is an 
ambiguous effect on religious contributions.  On the one had incomes may rise due to new work 
                                                 
1 See Iannaccone (1998) for information on the prevalence and determinants of religious participation. 
2 Examples include Barrow and McCleary (2005 and 2003), Finke and Stark (2005), McBride (2005), Montgomery 
(2003), and Voas, Olson, and Crockett (2002).   
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activities, and this could increase contributions. On the other hand, new secular consumption 
opportunities compete with religious giving for a share of the individual’s budget, and this could decrease 
contributions. 
  We then turn to an empirical investigation of the impact of secular competition by studying the 
large number of states that repealed their blue laws over the past forty years.  The fact that our measure of 
competition comes from a policy-driven change in a state’s laws allows us to clearly identify and model 
variation in competition, helping us surpass the empirical problems faced by prior work on inter-religious 
competition.   
We begin by using data from the General Social Survey (GSS) on religious attendance to show a 
very strong reduction in religious attendance when the blue laws are repealed, particularly among those 
who had been relatively frequent attendees before repeal. We also use data from the Consumer 
Expenditure Survey (CEX) to document a strong decline in religious contributions when blue laws are 
repealed, despite no change in other charitable activity.  We confirm these findings using a unique dataset 
of budget data for four major Christian denominations over the past forty years, which show a significant 
decline in church expenditures when the blue laws are repealed.  These results do not seem to be driven 
by declines in religiosity prior to the law change, nor do we see comparable declines in membership or 
giving to non-religious organizations after a state repeals its laws.  Thus, secular competition does matter 
for religious participation: increased secular opportunities for work and leisure on Sundays lead to less 
time at church and lower religious contributions. 
  One additional reason we might care about these findings is that changes in the opportunity cost 
of religious participation may have negative consequences for individuals or society.  In the final section, 
we test this possibility using data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY) on 
consumption of alcohol and illegal drugs.  We find that repealing blue laws leads to an increase in 
drinking and drug use behavior.  To confirm the causal nature of these findings, we compare the impacts 
on individuals who were attending church before the law changes, and were therefore affected, with those  
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who were non-attendees, and we find the effects are concentrated in the former group.  The effect is 
economically significant; for example the gap in heavy drinking between religious and non religious 
individuals falls by about half after the laws are repealed.   
  Our paper proceeds as follows.  Part I provides a brief history of the blue laws in the U.S., and 
discusses their repeal in a number of states.  Part II develops a model of time and budget allocation which 
allows us to demonstrate the impact of blue laws-like constraints, and their removal.  Part III presents our 
analysis of secular competition and time allocation, using data on religious attendance in the GSS.  Part 
IV presents our analysis of religious giving in the CEX and of church budget data.  Part V documents the 
impact of blue law repeal on alcohol consumption and drug use.  Part VI concludes. 
 
Part I: Background on the Blue Laws 
  This section provides a brief overview on the history of blue laws in the United States.
3  Blue 
laws, or Sunday closing laws, refer to laws which restrict certain activities on the Sabbath.  The origin of 
the term “blue laws” is disputed.   
Blue laws have a long history in America, dating back to 1610. All thirteen colonies had Sunday 
closing laws.  By the end of the 19
th century, nearly every state had at least some law prohibiting certain 
activities on Sunday.  Laws prohibiting general retail activity on Sundays were fairly widespread as of the 
middle of the 20
th century.  These laws frequently prohibited “labor” or “all manner of public selling,” but 
often made exceptions for acts of charity.
4   Blue laws prohibiting very specific types of activities, such as 
barbering or the sale of alcohol were also fairly common.
5   
In 1961 the Supreme Court issued a number of decisions on the constitutionality of blue laws.  
                                                 
3 The discussion here draws primarily from Goos (2005) and Laband and Heinbuch (1987).   
4 States sometimes exempted certain types of retail activity, for example by allowing pharmacies to stay open on 
Sunday.  We describe below some states that provide extensive exemptions to their laws. 
5 We had hoped to include laws prohibiting alcohol sales in our study, but these laws are very seldom repealed all at 
once.  States allowing alcohol sales often do so through a series of small adjustments and exemptions which are 
difficult to quantify.   
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The most important of these decisions, for the case McGowan v. Maryland, upheld the constitutionality of 
blue laws, but in so doing stated that blue laws could be found unconstitutional if their classification of 
prohibited activities rested “on grounds wholly irrelevant to the achievement of the State’s objective.”   
Following this ruling, blue laws were frequently challenged on the basis that they did not satisfy 
this constitutional test (Theuman, 2005).  These challenges were successful on a number of occasions 
because blue laws were sometimes confusing in their classification of prohibited activities.  For example, 
in Arkansas it was permissible on Sunday to sell film and flashbulbs, but not cameras.  Some New Jersey 
counties allowed the sale of disposable diapers, but washable diapers were prohibited (King, 1976).  In 
the decades following this ruling, most states repealed their blue laws either through judicial or legislative 
action (Goos, 2005).   
Some economic work has considered the impact blue laws have on labor and profitability.  
Tullock (1975) makes the point that firms in communities with blue laws may see their profits fall as the 
laws are repealed, although Moorhouse (1984) presents empirical evidence which contradicts Tullock’s 
hypothesis.  Gradus (1996) shows that in theory changes in blue laws may lead to an increase in 
employment.  Using multiple datasets, Goos (2005) provides evidence that repealing blue laws generally 
had a positive impact on employment in industries which had been subject to the laws, although this may 
have been offset to some extent by falls in employment elsewhere.  No work has examined the relation 
between these laws and either religious participation or other behavioral measures. 
To examine the effects of these repeals on religious participation, we gathered information on 
each state’s blue laws from the 1950s until the present.  Our goal was to find as many states as possible 
where we could document a discreet and significant change in the prohibition of retail activity on 
Sundays.  Some states did not satisfy these criteria; the most common reason being that the state’s laws 
were (or are) decided at the county or city level, making these states unusable with our state-level 
datasets.  A few states were not used because we could not verify the exact time that the laws were 
repealed.  Four states were dropped because they had too many exceptions to their laws.  Finally, seven  
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western states never had any retail blue laws during this time period and were also dropped.
6   
Table 1 lists the remaining states and the year when their laws were repealed, either by judicial 
action or act of the legislature.   The table also lists which states are excluded and the primary reason for 
exclusion.  While many states are not usable, the states whose laws are suitable for analysis make up a 
fairly diverse group.
7  Figure 1 illustrates the sample of usable states.  While there are relatively few states 
in the west and in New England, we nevertheless have at least some representation in all areas of the 
country, and there does not appear to be any pattern in the timing of when laws are repealed in any given 
part of the country.  
Moreover, the phenomena contributing to a state’s repealing its blue laws are varied and 
somewhat idiosyncratic. The Supreme Court’s 1961 decision set the groundwork for finding such laws 
unconstitutional, but legal challenges to blue laws occurred both before and after this ruling (Raucher, 
1994).  Some states, such as Vermont, Minnesota, and Utah, had laws which were repealed but were first 
the subject of court battles that lasted years.  Some states, such as North Dakota, repealed their laws 
through legislative action that came immediately after court rulings. Other states, such as Texas, changed 
their laws in part because of lobbying by regulated industries.  In some states a particular individual 
played a key role in repealing the laws.  Blue laws in South Carolina were repealed in part because of the 
efforts of former governor Richard Riley (King, 1985), and blue laws were maintained in many 
communities in and around New Jersey through the efforts of the businessman Sydney Schlesinger 
(Lynch, 1978).  
                                                 
6 We have re-estimated the main regressions on each dataset below adding these western states in, and in every case 
the results are similar to those presented here. 
7 In comparison to the table of laws presented in Appendix A of Goos (2005), there are a few differences here.  First, 
Goos identifies several states that still have laws on the books; most of these states (Alabama, Kentucky, Maine, 
New Hampshire, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, and West Virginia) are excluded from our analysis for other reasons—
for instance, they either set their laws by county or they provide so many exceptions to the laws over time that it is 
unclear when and if the law stopped being enforced.  For South Carolina, Goos states that laws are still on the books 
but that some counties can overturn these laws.  However, the amendments to Section 53-1-5 of South Carolina’s 
state code allowed businesses to open for most of the day Sunday, and subsequent amendments gave counties the 
ability to further weaken the law.  Moreover, South Carolina exempted a number of industries from Sunday 
regulation entirely in 1985, although individuals were still allowed to object to working on Sundays without facing 
any penalty from their employers.  Our categorization of South Carolina consequently differs from Goos’.  
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 It is also difficult to generalize about the role of special interest groups in repealing blue laws.  
Retail establishments sometimes supported blue laws and sometimes did not.  Often different retailers in 
the same state disagreed about the value of the laws (Hansard, 1985).  Support for the laws could vary 
even among similarly-sized businesses in a state (Barmash, 1986), although small businesses were more 
likely to support the laws (Laband and Heinbuch, 1987).  Labor unions have both argued for and against 
the value of blue laws (Merry, 1983).  In a study that underscores the heterogeneous circumstances 
associated with blue laws’ repeal, Price and Yandle (1987) examined what economic and social forces are 
correlated with the presence of state blue laws.  Looking at the political makeup of a state, the fraction of 
women in the workforce, the strength of labor unions, and other state socioeconomic characteristics, they 
found that none of their covariates were consistently associated with the presence of blue laws.   
While changes in blue laws may not be consistently associated with any particular socioeconomic 
trend, repealing the laws may not be an exogenous event.  Repealing the laws may coincide with changes 
in economic conditions or other circumstances that lower a population’s taste for “social capital.”  Or, it 
may be the case that declining levels of religiosity led to the laws being repealed, rather than the other 
way around.  We address these concerns in the empirical section of the paper first by including a number 
of controls for a state’s socioeconomic circumstances.  Additionally, we also test for reverse causality and 
for blue laws coinciding with a decline in other types of social participation. These tests are described 
more in parts III, IV, and V of the paper.  Part V, which documents the impact of blue laws on alcohol 
and drug use, also includes results from very strong specifications which control for all observed and 
unobserved phenomena varying across states in a given year.   
Another concern is that blue laws may not have been enforced prior to their repeal.  If blue laws 
were not enforced, then their repeal should not have a significant effect on the opportunity cost or 
religious participation and this will bias us away from observing any effect empirically.  However, for 
many states we were able to uncover newspaper stories and other evidence indicating the economic 
significance of changes in the laws (a sample includes McGee, 1991; Reinhold, 1985; The New York  
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Times, 1970; and the Associated Press, 1984).  The following section theoretically explores how these 
changes in the laws may affect religious attendance and donations. 
 
Part II: A Model of Religious and Secular Time Allocation and Consumption 
In this section, we develop a model to illustrate how blue law repeal might impact religious 
participation.   Our model considers an individual deciding how to spend time and money on Sunday.  
The purpose of the model is to provide predictions on what effect (if any) blue laws might have on the 
two key aspects of religious participation that are available in our data: religious attendance and religious 
contributions. 
The blue laws might affect individuals’ decisions through two channels. First, they may constrain 
an individual’s ability to work on Sunday.  Second, they might constrain an individual’s ability to 
consume secular goods and services on Sunday.  It turns out that imposing either type of constraint will 
generally lead to a rise in church attendance, but that the effects of the constraints on church donations is 
less clear. 
Consider an individual who can spend money on two activities; one is religious and one is 
secular.  Further, the individual can spend his time Sunday working, participating in secular leisure 
activities, or attending church.  More formally, let individual i' s utility function be given by  
) ( ) , , ( S i S R R i x V t t x U + . 
where  R x  is donations to church,  S x  is secular consumption,  R t  is time spent in church, and  S t  is time 
spent on secular activities. We assume utility is increasing in inputs, concave, continuous, and 
differentiable.  Additive separability in S x allows us to avoid excessive machinery; its usefulness should 
become clear during the analysis.  Importantly, we will not make any explicit assumptions about the 
relationship between  R t  and  R x  in the above utility function; this relationship has been a point of debate 
in the literature (Gruber, 2003).  
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The amount of available time on Sunday is set to unity, so  1 £ + S R t t .  The individual earns a 
wage rate w by working on Sunday; thus wage earnings from Sunday are  ) 1 ( S R t t w - - .  The 
individual’s budget constraint is  
I wt wt x p x S R S S R £ + + +  
where potential income  y w I + =  includes both the earnings potential for working on Sundays, w, as 
well as income not derived from working on Sunday, y.  For example y might include labor income from 
the rest of the week as well as non-labor income.  Thus, even if an individual does not work at all on 
Sunday, the individual may still be able to consume R x and S x .
8  
We allow blue laws to have effects in two ways.  First, these laws may limit or prohibit work 
opportunities, so that  w S R t t a ³ + .  Thus, if blue laws prohibit work entirely, then  1 = w a  and 
1 = + S R t t .   We call this restriction the work restriction. Second, blue laws may restrict or prohibit 
secular consumption.  We follow Glaeser and Shleifer (2001) in modeling this restriction as a restriction 
on the quantity of secular consumption allowed, so that  S S x a £ .  If secular consumption is prohibited 
entirely on Sundays, then  0 = S a .  We call this restriction the consumption restriction. 
  The individual, in the presence of these laws, thus maximizes  
) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) , , ( w S R w S S S S R S S R S i S R R i t t x wt wt x p x I x V t t x U a m a m l - + + - + - - - - + +  
                                                 
8 The inclusion of income not earned on Sunday y raises the valid question of whether other days of the week should 
be added to the model.  It turns out that other days are superfluous.  If we considered two days of the week, Sunday 
and Not Sunday, and rewrote the utility function and budget constraint as  








R S R R i x V x t t x t t x U +
 








R S R S S R £ + + + + + + +
 
where the superscript NS denotes choice variables for Not Sunday, and  y w I + = 2 , none of the intuition that follows 
would change as long as consumption on Sundays and consumption on Not Sunday are not perfect substitutes 
(although this would follow from the assumptions we make below).    We therefore focus on the simpler situation 
where there is only one day of the week.  
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where the first two terms are utility, the third is the budget constraint, and the last two terms are non-
negativity conditions imposed by the blue laws.
9 
In a situation where there are no blue laws, the Kuhn-Tucker multipliers  S m  and  w m  are set to 
zero. Denote the unconstrained solutions in this case as
* * * , , R S R t x x , and 
*
S t .  We assume these choice 
variables are strictly normal in potential income I, so that if  I I ¢ ¢ < ¢ then  ) ( ) (
* * I x I x R R ¢ ¢ < ¢ , and similarly 
for the other three choice variables.
10  We also assume that unconstrained solutions are differentiable in 
potential income.  It could also be the case that blue laws are in place but individuals would choose the 
same outcomes regardless of whether the laws were in place or not. Then,  S m  and  w m are again set to 
zero and the optimal solutions are the same as the unconstrained solutions.  In this case, repealing blue 
laws will have no affect on an individual’s optimum allocation of time and money.   
Consider next the case where the work restriction is binding, but the consumption restriction is 
not. That is,  0 = S m  and 0 ¹ w m . In this case, the individual is at a corner solution and cannot spend as 
much time working as he would choose were there no blue laws and 
* *
S R w S R t t t t + > = + a .  As the 
work constraint is relaxed and  w a  is lowered, it follows that time on work will increase, and aggregate 
time spent not working will decrease.  The easily derived first order conditions show that in equilibrium 
the marginal rate of substitution between  R t  and  S t  is unity and does not change as  w a  is lowered. The 
following weak assumption is sufficient (but not necessary) to ensure a robust response of both  R t  and  S t  
as  w a  falls. 
                                                 
9  We focus only on the two Kuhn-Tucker conditions related to the laws, and assume that the standard Kuhn-Tucker 
conditions on non-negativity of the choice variables are not relevant. The solutions are thus “interior” except to the 
extent that policy constraints create corner solutions. 
10 Recall that I reflects potential income, rather than just wage earnings.  An increase in I might be construed as an 
increase in the value of all the resources (temporal and monetary) at an individual’s disposal; it consequently seems 
reasonable to assume that the choice variables are normal in I.  
  10 
Assumption 1:  (a) the marginal rate of substitution between  R t  and  S t  is not a function of  R x , and (b) 
















Part (a) of Assumption 1 is satisfied by a number of well-known utility functions, such as a constant 
elasticity of substitution utility function. Part (b) of Assumption 1 is not very strong in that if it did not 
hold for either temporal good  i t  the Hessian matrix would not be negative semidefinite and the utility 
function would not be quasiconcave.  Also, this condition allows the cross-partial derivative of utility 








  Under this assumption, as the work constraint is relaxed, it must be the case that both  R t  and  S t  
fall.  To see this, take the derivative of the marginal rate of substitution between  R t  and  S t , denoted 
S R t t U U / , with respect to   S t .  The derivative can be written  
2 ) /( ) (
S S S R S S R t t t t t t t U U U U U -  which is 
positive by the first order conditions and by Assumption 1.  Similar work can show that the marginal rate 
of substitution is falling with respect to  R t .  Thus, we know that after the blue laws change, the only way 
the marginal rate of substitution can be set to its equilibrium value is through changes in  R t  and  S t  (and 
not through changes in  R x  and  S x ).  It follows that, if the sum of  R t  and  S t  falls as work rises, that both 
R t  and  S t  must fall.  If one fell and the other increased (or stayed the same), than the marginal rate of 
substitution would not be the same after the law changed as it had been before the law changed.   
  As the work constraint is relaxed, the net effect on church donations, R x , is more difficult.  On the 
one hand, total spending on  R x  and  S x  combined will rise as “expenditures” on  R t  and  S t  fall.  But it is 
possible that only secular consumption rises with earned income, and that church donations either stay the 
same or fall.    
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i i t x
,
2 / 1 2 / 1 2 2  and let  1 = S p . It is easy 
to see that these preferences satisfy Assumption 1.  Given a binding work constraint, the individual will 
set  2 / w S R t t a = = , and will set  2 / ) ( w S R w I x x a - = = .  Here as the constraint is relaxed and 
w a falls,  R x  rises.   
  Now, instead, suppose utility can be represented as ( ) S S R R x t t x 2
2 2 / 1 2 / 1 2 / 1 + + +  and again let 
1 = S p .  The term in parentheses is a constant elasticity of substitution function with an elasticity of 
substitution equal to 2.  This example also satisfies all the conditions on preferences we have stated, 
including Assumption 1.  Here, however, under a binding work constraint it can be shown from the first 
order conditions on  R x  and  S x  that the individual will set  w R x a 2 = , so that as the constraint is relaxed 
and  w a falls,  R x  falls.  Thus, the work constraint has a clear affect on temporal activities, but an 
indeterminate effect on expenditures, and in particular on church donations. 
Consider next the case where the consumption restriction is binding but the work restriction is 
not, so that  0 ¹ S m  and 0 = w m  and 
*
S S S x x < =a .  Then as the consumption constraint is relaxed, 
secular consumption will rise, and by the budget constraint it follows that total “expenditures” on the 
other three choice variables will fall. 
Consider first how a relaxation of the consumption constraint will affect time in church,  R t .  Let 
optimal choice of  R t  in the face of the consumption constraint be given as 
* *
R t .  Given the setup of the 
utility function (in particular, additive separability), the optimal solution in this case solves 
)
~
( ) , , ( max
, ,
S R R S R R i
t t x wt wt x I t t x U
S R R
- - - +l   
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where  S S p I I a - =
~



























.  We make the following technical 
assumption on the wealth expansion path of secular consumption.  Again, this assumption is fairly weak: 
Assumption 2:  In the unconstrained case, the marginal propensity to consume 
*
S x  does not converge to 
unity as potential income I goes to infinity. 
Assumption 2 ensures that as potential income I grows without bound that in the unconstrained case 
expenditures on all goods other than  S x  also grow without bound.  
It follows from Assumption 2, and the assumption that all goods are strictly normal in I in the 
unconstrained case, that 
* *
R t  is normal inI
~
.  To see this, suppose instead that that 
*
R t  was normal in I but 
* *
R t  was not normal in I
~
.  Then there exists income levels 
1 ~
I  and 
2 ~
I , 
2 1 ~ ~






2 * * 1 * * I t I t R R > .  Define the function  ) ( ) (
* I x p I I f S S - = .  It follows from the budget constraint, the 
assumption that the unconstrained solutions are strictly normal and differentiable in I, and from 
Assumption 2 that  ) (I f  is continuous, monotonically increasing without bound, and 0 ) 0 ( = f .  
Therefore, there exists an income level I¢ where 
1 * ~
) ( ) ( I I x p I I f S S = ¢ - ¢ = ¢ , and  )
~
( ) (
1 * * * I t I t R R = ¢ .  
Similarly, there exists an income level I ¢ ¢  where 
2 * ~
) ( I I x p I S S = ¢ ¢ - ¢ ¢ , and  )
~
( ) (
2 * * * I t I t R R = ¢ ¢ .  Since 
) (I f  is monotonically increasing, we know  I I ¢ ¢ < ¢ . Then by normality of 
*
R t  we have  ) ( ) (
* * I t I t R R ¢ ¢ < ¢ .  





* 2 * * 1 * * * I t I t I t I t R R R R ¢ ¢ = > = ¢ , and we have a contradiction. 















.  Intuitively, as the consumption constraint is weakened, secular consumption will rise and 
individuals have less income to spend on other goods. The normality of  R t  ensures that time in church  
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will fall as total expenditures on goods besides secular consumption fall.  Regarding the other choice 
variables, it should be clear that the similar and equally reasonable assumption of their normality leads to 
the same conclusion.  The assumption that church donations are normal with respect to potential income 
thus leads to church donations falling as the consumption restriction is weakened.  Assumption 2 is 
important because it ensures that any observed outcome in the constrained case can be reproduced in the 
unconstrained case.  This might not happen if total expenditures on donations and temporal goods in the 
unconstrained case asymptotically approached a finite amount as potential income grew.  In such a 
situation, constraining  S x  may force an individual to spend more on donations and temporal goods than 




Finally, there is the case where both the work restriction and the consumption restriction are 
binding.  This case is simply a composite of the above situations.  When the work restriction is relaxed, 
time on secular and religious activities will each fall and work will increase. Similarly, if church 
attendance is a normal good then time on religious activities will fall when the consumption restriction is 
relaxed; the overall first-order effect of the laws on time allocation is therefore unambiguous.  For 
religious donations, however, the effect is less clear.  While normality of church donations suggests that 
weakening the consumption constraint might lead to less donations, it is possible that weakening the work 
constraint would have an effect in the opposite direction.  
  To summarize, blue laws have the potential to restrict both a person’s ability to work and a 
person’s ability to consume secular goods and services.  It is possible that neither of these restrictions 
affects an individual’s decisions, and so repealing the laws would have no affect on consumer behavior.  
In the event that blue laws do affect an individual’s decisions, under weak conditions repealing the laws 
will unambiguously lead to less time spent on religious activities.  This is because after the laws are 
repealed formerly constrained individuals will increase time on work and secular consumption, and both  
  14 
of these crowd out time spent on religious activities.  The situation is more complicated for religious 
donations.  On the one hand, individuals who had been facing a restriction on work will respond to the 
laws being repealed by working more and spending more on both secular consumption and religious 
donations, and so religious donations could rise.  On the other hand, if donations are normal individuals 
who had been facing a restriction on secular consumption will respond to the laws being repealed by 
substituting out of religious donations and spending more on secular consumption.  The next part of the 
paper begins the empirical analysis on the impact of blue laws on the allocation of time and money. 
 
Part III: Secular Competition and Time Allocation 
GSS Data and Empirical Methods 
  Our empirical analysis of the time allocation effect of the blue laws begins with modeling their 
impact on religious attendance.  To carry out this analysis, we turn to the General Social Survey (GSS), 
the longest-running national survey that gathers data on religious participation.  In most years since 1972, 
this survey has asked a sample of 1,500 to 2,500 respondents about their frequency of religious 
attendance.   There are nine possible responses to this question: never; less than once per year; about once 
or twice a year; several times a year; about once a month; two to three times a month; nearly every week; 
every week; and several times a week.  For the basic analysis below, we simply use the linear index 
formed by these responses (with values 0 through 8); given that each interval represents roughly a 
doubling of attendance frequency, this is akin to a log scale.  But we also show as well the effects on 
particular categories of responses. 
  Our sample covers the years 1973 to 1998.  We consider individuals in the states with usable blue 
laws data listed in Table 1.  We limit the sample to individuals who report their “religious preference” as 
Catholic or Protestant, as these individuals are those most likely to attend services on Sunday (these  
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individuals make up nearly 90 percent of the sample).
11  Additionally, we drop data from a given state in 
the year the law changed.  Given the sample period covered, we have 10 states with policy changes 
(Indiana, Minnesota, North Dakota, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, 
Virginia, and Vermont), and 6 states that can serve as controls because policy didn’t change in this period 
(Florida, Iowa, Kansas, Ohio, Utah and Washington) 
 Table 2 is a table of means; the first panel presents the means of selected variables of interest 
from the GSS.  The average value of our attendance index, which ranges from 0 (never) to 8 (several 
times a week) is slightly above 4, which corresponds to monthly attendance.  (The median response is 
attendance 2-3 times a month).  The table also shows that GSS somewhat over-samples female 
respondents.
12   
  We use these data to estimate models of the form 
e u f d g b + + + + + = t j jt ijt jt ijt Z X Laws A  
where Aijt is religious attendance for individual i in state j in year t;  jt Laws  is an indicator for whether the 
blue laws are still in place in state j in year t; Xijt is a set of characteristics of the individual i (age, age 
squared, gender, dummies for race, dummies for educational attainment, and a dummy for being married); 
Zjt is a set of state/year control variables (state percent black, state percent foreign born, inflation-adjusted 
per-capita disposable income, and the statewide rate of insured unemployment);  j f  is a set of state 
dummies;  and  t u  is a set of year dummies.  This “difference-in-difference” equation thus assesses 
whether repealing the blue laws causes a deviation from a state’s mean of participation relative to other 
states at this time.  Following Bertrand et al. (2004), we cluster our standard errors at the state level; our 
standard errors are similar if clustered at the state/year level. 
                                                 
11 We also considered examining the effects of blue laws on Jews, for whom blue laws should not matter since their 
day of worship is not Sunday.  The estimates were insignificant as expected, although the sample was too small for 
the results to be regarded as reliable.  
12 We compared data on observable characteristics such as age and gender in the sample of states used in the 
regressions to the sample of states excluded. The means were generally similar.  
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Results 
  The results from this analysis are presented in Table 3.  The first column shows our basic 
difference-in-difference regression for the religious attendance index.  We find a statistically significant 
negative effect on religious attendance of blue law repeal in the first row; in brackets under the coefficient 
is the state-clustered standard error.  The result indicates that repealing the blue laws reduced attendance 
by 0.21 index points, or about 5 percent of the sample mean.  This is a sizeable effect: it is one-third as 
large as the well-noted higher rate of religious attendance for women, for example.  Thus, the prediction 
of the model developed above is clearly borne out: raising secular competition lowers religious 
attendance. 
  The coefficients on the remaining control variables are as expected and reported in previous 
studies.  Older persons and females are more likely to attend, as are those who are more educated (the 
excluded category of education).   There is little relation to state/year variables. 
  Table 4 shows the results separately by attendance category in order to understand the nature of 
shifts in attendance. Each column is a separate regression where a dummy for that attendance category is 
used as the dependent variable.  There is little effect on those who attend more than weekly; at least two 
factors may explain this.  First, it is possible that such individuals are not constrained by the prohibitions 
on secular activity that blue laws entail.  In the context of the model presented earlier, these are 
individuals at an “interior” solution at which the work constraint and the consumption constraint do not 
bind.  Alternately, an individual may attend church (for instance) 4 days a week when blue laws are in 
place, and after they are repealed their attendance may fall to 3 days a week—but since such attendance is 
still “several times a week” we do not observe this decline. 
There is, however, a very large negative coefficient on the effect of attending weekly, which 
represents a 15 percent decline in the prevalence of that category.   There are then no effects on attending 
about weekly, 2-3 times per month, or once per month, positive and significant effects on attending  
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several times a year or 1-2 times per year, and no effect on not attending at all.  Thus, the results appear to 
indicate a shift down the distribution: those attending weekly move to lower attendance, raising the 
prevalence of nearby categories (such as about weekly), but individuals in those categories reduce 
attendance as well, leading to an offsetting decrease and no net effect, as well as an increased prevalence 
of rare attendance.  The fact that there is no change in the “no attendance” category implies that 
individuals are not dropping out of church-going altogether, but rather that they are simply going less 
frequently.  Of course, without panel data, we cannot prove that these shifts are occurring.  Nevertheless, 
the most consistent interpretation of these results is that repeal of the blue laws does not induce casual 
church-goers to forgo attendance entirely, but rather serve to reduce attendance among regular church-
goers.   
 
Specification Checks 
  The strong correlation between repealing the blue laws and reduced church-going is striking.  Our 
causal interpretation of this finding rests on the assumption that nothing else changed at the same time as 
the blue laws that also caused a decline in church-going. In this section we present three tests designed to 
support that assumption. 
  A common threat to the validity of any difference-in-difference exercise of this nature is 
underlying trends in the data.  If there was a downward trend in church-going at the same time as the 
repeal of the blue laws, this would appear as a causal effect of the blue laws. As mentioned earlier, it is 
even possible that blue laws were repealed where church-going was weakening, so that there was more 
demand for secular opportunities on Sundays. 
  We test this alternative in two ways. First, we include in our model state-specific time trends.  If 
there is an underlying trend in church going over time within the states that repeal the blue laws, these 
controls will help capture that trend.  The second column of Table 3 includes these state-specific trend 
terms.   As this column shows, if anything the addition of these trend terms strengthens the results.  
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  Second, we run a falsification test: we include in the model a dummy for the two years before the 
blue law repeal (a “placebo” dummy).  If blue law repeal is just picking up a pre-existing reduction in 
demand for church-going, then this should be captured in this “lead” term.  In fact, the lead term is 
insignificant, and our estimated effect of the blue laws is unchanged from the first column.
13 
  While these results are compelling, they are unable to rule out a simultaneous change in church-
going attitudes and blue law repeal.  We have tried to control for simultaneous economic conditions using 
the state/year disposable income and insured rate of unemployment.  As a further test, we note that if 
there are omitted factors which drive down religious participation, they are likely to reduce participation 
in other group activities as well.  The GSS collects data on whether the respondent is a member of one of 
a set of organizations, such as fraternal orders, political clubs, sports clubs or hobby clubs – as well as a 
member of church groups.  In the second panel of Table 4, we show that there is a negative effect of blue 
law repeal on being a member of church groups, but no effect on the odds of being a member of any other 
group.  These findings are once again inconsistent with a spurious interpretation of our results on 
attendance. 
 
Part IV: Secular Competition and Religious Contributions 
Data and Empirical Methods 
  While the results in Part III confirmed our conclusion from the theory model about religious 
attendance, we had no such clear prediction for religious contributions.  In this section, we use data from 
two sources to address the impacts on religious contributions. 
  The first source is the Consumer Expenditure Survey (CEX).  The CEX collects data for a 
nationally representative set of households on an inventory of their consumption expenditures, including 
charitable contributions.  Charitable contributions are divided into contributions to: religious 
                                                 
13 Adding time trends and the placebo dummy to the regressions done by attendance group in Panel A of Table 4 
yields similar results—for each regression the estimates grow stronger when trends are added, and are unchanged by 
adding a placebo dummy.  The placebo dummy is in all cases insignificant.  
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organizations; educational organizations; political organizations; charitable organizations (e.g. the United 
Way); and other organizations.  The CEX data are collected quarterly, but contributions information is 
only collected in the last interview, and respondents are asked about their charitable giving over the past 
year.  We use these CEX data for the period from 1980 through 1998.   
  These CEX data have the disadvantage that due to the time period covered, and the states reliably 
sampled by the CEX, we only have three state changes to study, those in Tennessee in 1981 and in 
Minnesota and Texas in 1985, and only 9 control states.  Because of the small number of states included 
in these data, the results were more sensitive to clustering standard errors by state versus state and year.  
When the state-level controls were excluded, results were very similar from both approaches. But when 
they are included, the standard errors using state clustering grow by 50 percent, although the coefficient is 
unchanged.  We therefore present results here showing both state/year and state clustering. 
  We also turn to a more complete source of data from the yearbooks collected by Christian 
denominations themselves.  In particular, we have compiled church expenditures at the state and year 
level for four major Christian denominations from the period 1950 to 2000; the collection of these data is 
described in much more detail in Gruber and Hungerman (2006).   We chose for our analysis any of the 
largest denominations which reported annual data at the state level (or at a finer level of detail that could 
be aggregated up to states) over the 1950 to 2000 period.  The resultant sample includes the Lutheran 
Church Missouri Synod (in 1971 this denomination was the 7
th largest in the country), the Southern 
Baptist Convention (2
nd), the United Church of Christ (9
th), and the United Methodist Church (3
rd).
14   
While it is likely these denominations are not perfectly representative of all churchgoers in the 
United States, all four of these denominations are among the largest in the country, and they represent a 
fairly diverse group of adherents in terms of regional location, growth trends over time, and religious and 
social conservatism. These denominations are fairly widespread; the data cover 15 of the 16 states for 
which we have usable blue laws data (the lone state which is not covered by any of our denomination data 
                                                 
14 Data on denomination sizes came from the Glenmary Research Center (1974).    
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is Utah).  For most of the states we have data for multiple denominations. 
  These data do not measure our variable of most interest, donations to the church.  But they do 
measure total church spending, which serves as an alternate measure of the resources available to a 
church.  We therefore model whether church spending per member rises or declines when blue laws are 
repealed.  Our empirical model is the same type of difference-in-difference model used earlier (although 
the regression does not include individual-level regressors, as our unit of observation is all the 
congregations in a given denomination, in a given state and year).  All standard errors are clustered at the 
state level.   
 
CEX Results 
  Table 5 presents the results of this analysis for the CEX.  We show results for total dollars of 
religious contributions, the log of contributions (conditional on making any), and the probability of 
contributing.  When using total dollars, we censor the top 1 percent of observations at the 99
th percentile 
value to minimize the influence of outliers.  The regression includes the control variables noted earlier, 
but we just show the coefficients of interest. 
  The results show a sizeable decline in religious charitable contributions when blue laws are 
repealed.  Repeal is associated with a decline in religious charitable contributions of $109 on average, 
which is about 25 percent of the sample mean of $433.  This consists of a large 13 percent reduction in 
the amount of giving, conditional on giving, and a small and insignificant reduction in the odds of giving.  
This is consistent with the notion that those attached to church scale back their participation, but do not 
sever ties completely.  These estimates are significant when we cluster standard errors at the state/year 
level, but not so when we cluster at the state level.   
  The next three columns demonstrate that this result is not driven by unobserved factors which 
were reducing charitable activity at the time of blue laws repeal by looking at charitable giving to sources 
other than religious organizations.  There are actually large increases in other forms of charitable giving,  
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which could represent some reallocation in response to the blue laws, but at a minimum does not suggest 
underlying taste shifts towards charitable giving. 
  The second panel of the Table shows the results when we add state-specific time trends.
15  The 
estimated effect on the level of spending rises, while the estimated effect on the log of giving falls.  None 
are significant, but the general pattern of findings is similar. Thus, for the limited set of repeals that we 
are able to study in the CEX data, we see a sizeable decline in the level of religious charitable 
contributions. 
 
Church Spending Results 
  Table 6 turns to our alternative source of data, church spending per member.  This source has the 
disadvantage that it only has a proxy for our variable of interest (donations), which is church spending. 
But it has the advantage of extending over a very long time period across states, allowing us to study the 
full set of repeals in this time period.   Our data is at the level of denomination/state/year, so we include in 
the model, in addition to the usual set of state and year fixed effects, a full set of denomination fixed 
effects; interactions between the denomination fixed effects and the state fixed effects; and interactions 
between the denomination fixed effects and the year fixed effects.  Our model also includes the state-level 
controls used in the previous section.  We weight the regressions by church membership in the 
denomination/state/year cell, and once again cluster the standard errors by state.   
  Panel A of Table 6 shows our basic findings.  In the first column, we find that church spending 
per member fell by 6.3 percent when the blue laws were repealed; the result is statistically significant.  In 
the second column, we add the number of members in the denomination/state/year cell as a control, to 
capture potential scale effects in spending per member.  This has no effect on the estimates. 
  The next two columns of panel A pursue the specification checks we have used throughout the 
                                                 
15 We are not able to estimate the falsification using the “lead” term here since one of our three changes happens so 
early in the sample period.  
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paper: including state-specific linear trends and undertaking a falsification check by putting in a dummy 
which becomes unity two years before the repeal.  Neither of these changes has much effect on the result. 
  One might wonder whether these denominational results are driven by a particular denomination.  
The sample sizes and incomplete geographic coverage of each denomination makes running the 
regressions on one denomination at a time problematic.  However, we can remove each denomination 
from the pooled result and see whether the results change, and in so doing assess the results’ sensitivity to 
each denomination.  Panel B of Table 6 assesses whether any particular denomination is driving this 
result by excluding one denomination at a time.  In every case the coefficient remains negative, and in 
most cases remains significant.  The most noticeable change is a reduction in the coefficient to about two-
thirds of its size when the Southern Baptist Convention is excluded.  That the results are most sensitive to 
this denomination is not too surprising given that it is the largest denomination in the dataset.  However, 
when the placebo dummy or time trends are added, the results are similar regardless of what 
denominations are excluded, and in all such cases the result is at least marginally significant.   
 
Part V: Implications for Outcomes 
  The results thus far suggest that repealing the blue laws causes a reduction in religious 
participation along both the giving and going margins.  This is important because it suggests that the 
secular and religious worlds do effectively compete for time allocation among Americans.  But it might 
have additional implications as well.  As reviewed in Gruber (2005), there is an enormous literature 
outside of economics which documents strong correlations between religious participation and positive 
outcomes, such as improved health and reduced criminal activity.  If there is a link between participation 
and other outcomes, than changes in blue laws may impact other activities besides attendance and 
donations.  Moreover, as highlighted by Table 4, changes in blue laws should have effects only for 
church-goers, and not for those who do not attend religious services.   
  For this section, we turn to the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY), which follows a  
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cohort of youth initially ages 14-21. The survey began in 1979 and has continued through the 1980s and 
1990s.   The NLSY has information on consumption of a variety of substances, including drinking, 
marijuana use, and cocaine use.  In addition, the NLSY has a particular advantage for our purposes: it 
contains information on prior religious attendance.  We cannot investigate the effects of blue laws on 
outcomes such as drinking and drug use in the GSS since church attendance is itself endogenous, so in 
categorizing individuals as frequent or infrequent attendees we would be using a selected sample.  The 
NLSY, however, is longitudinal data, and provides data on religious attendance in1979, before the blue 
laws were repealed for a number of states in our sample.  Thus, we can use pre-existing religious 
attendance as a basis for dividing the sample by attendance category. 
  The attendance measure in the NLSY is similar to the GSS’. In 1979 individuals were asked how 
often they had attended religious services in the past year.  Possible answers were not at all, infrequently, 
once per month, 2-3 times per month, once per week, and more than once per week.
16 
Our measure of heavy drinking equals unity if a respondent reports having had six or more drinks 
in one sitting sometime in the past month.  Between 1979 and 2000, this variable is available in the 
surveys taken in 1982, 1983, 1984, 1985, 1988, 1989, and 1994. Our measure of marijuana use is a 
dummy for whether a respondent has used marijuana in the past 30 days, and similarly for cocaine.  
Measures of marijuana/cocaine consumption are available in 1984, 1988, 1992 and 1994.
17 
  We begin by estimating the same type of difference-in-difference models described earlier.  
These regressions drop observations in the state and year that a law was changed, include the same 
individual-level controls used in the GSS, and cluster residuals by state. The results of this analysis are 
shown in the top panel of Table 7.  For alcohol consumption, using all waves of available data, we find 
                                                 
16 If attendance were available every year we could do a 2SLS analysis.  However, only lagged measures of 
attendance are available and so 2SLS is not feasible. 
17 One might also consider whether NLSY respondents change their hours worked after blue laws are repealed.  We 
examined both intensive and extensive work decisions in the NLSY, but in all cases found that blue laws have no 
effect.  This is possible if individuals who start working on Sundays substitute out of working on other days. Goos 
(2005) also finds an insignificant effect of blue laws on weekly employment when looking at all industries over the 
period 1982 to 1992 (see Table IV in his paper).    
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that repealing the blue laws leads to a rise in the odds of drinking of 1.5 percentage points, which is not 
significant.  This represents about a 4 percent increase relative to the sample mean. 
  The next two columns show the results for marijuana and cocaine consumption.  Here we find a 
positive and significant effect on marijuana consumption of 3.2 percentage points.  This is a very large 
effect which is more than 20 percent of the sample mean.  For cocaine, the coefficient is again positive 
and significant, and the marginal effect is nearly the same as the sample mean. 
  We then turn to estimating models which interact the repeal dummy with a dummy for whether 
the individual attended church in 1979.  The results from Tables 3 and 4 suggest that these individuals 
will attend church less when the blue laws are repealed.  Since we are considering the effect on groups 
within-state, we can actually include a full set of state*year interactions in these models, so that we are 
identifying the effect of repeal on those who are attendees (that is, those reporting a level of attendance 
above “not at all”) relative to those who are non attendees in the same state (attendees make up about 80 
percent of the entire sample).  This is an even richer specification than we have used earlier, controlling 
for any state-wide factors correlated with blue laws repeal.  These results are shown in the second panel 
of Table 7.   
  The results here are striking: for each of these three behaviors, we find significant effects of 
repeal on those who attend church, relative to those who do not.  For example, for drinking, we find that 
attendees are 5.5 percent more likely to drink than those who don’t attend, which is about 16 percent of 
the sample mean.
18 The coefficient represents about half of the difference in heavy drinking between 
attendees and non attendees.
19  
    
  The next two columns show the results for marijuana and cocaine consumption.  Once again, we 
obtain large and (at least marginally) significant interaction effects.  For marijuana, the effects are large, 
                                                 
18 For the alcohol regressions, about 80 percent of the sample is of legal drinking age. While these regressions 
include controls for age, we have also verified the robustness of the regression to using only those of legal drinking 
age. 
19 The mean of the heavy drinking variable for attendees is 0.315, for non attendees it is 0.403.  
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suggesting an 11 percent increase for attendees relative to non attendees.  These represent increases equal 
to most of the mean and essentially the entire gap in marijuana use between weekly attendees and non 
attendees.
20   For cocaine, the results are more modest but still large, with a roughly 3.6 percentage point 
effect on both very and somewhat frequent attendees, which is slightly larger than the sample mean and 
again essentially closes the gap in cocaine use between attendees and non attendees (although the 
standard errors are somewhat large).  Clearly there are strong effects of repeal on the most frequent 
attendees, relative to those with low or no church attendance. 
  Are these results evidence of a causal effect on religious participation?  The regressions in Table 
7 are very strong in that they include state-by-year dummies that will net out any statewide impact of the 
laws, or any statewide phenomenon associated with the laws’ repeal.  But the interaction with religious 
participation may be reflecting some other differential effect.  For example, females are more likely to 
attend church, and perhaps all we are capturing is differential effects of the blue laws on females.  To 
address this concern, in Table 8 we include a full set of interactions of the repeal dummy with other key 
demographic characteristics: marital status; college graduate; gender; and race.  Doing so has little effect 
on our estimates of interest; it appears that we are picking up the differential effect on participation and 
not some other correlate. 
 
Part VI: Conclusions 
  The results presented above confirm the important role that secular competition can have on 
religious behavior: when the blue laws are repealed, there is a significant drop in both religious 
attendance and religious contributions.  This is a striking finding which has a number of interesting 
implications. 
  First, this finding serves to validate economic models of religiosity, as discussed extensively by 
                                                 
20 The average for the marijuana variable for attendees and non attendees is 0.09, and 0.18, respectively.  For 
cocaine the respective means are 0.016 and 0.03.  
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Iannaccone (1998).  Religious participation is not independent of economic influences such as the 
opportunity cost of church-going.  This builds on a growing empirical literature which has highlighted the 
interaction between economic decisions and the religious sector (Chen 2005; Gruber and Hungerman, 
2006; Hungerman, 2005).  Moreover, this also shows that religious participation clearly is affected by 
competitive forces, and that secular opportunities do compete with religious opportunities for temporal 
and monetary resources. 
  Second, this finding can be a valuable input into the discussion of the regulation of religion and 
substitutable activities.  Absent strong negative externalities, there seems little argument for restricting the 
days of the week that commerce can take place.  But religious participation may be one of those activities 
with such externalities.  As such, secular regulations such as blue laws which promote religious 
participation can have external effects.  Whether those external effects are sufficiently large to justify 
restrictions on commerce is an excellent question for future research. 
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Table 1:  Sample of States and Time of Repeal 
 
State  Year of Repeal 
Florida  1969 
Iowa  1955 
Indiana  1977 
Kansas  1965 
Minnesota  1985 
North Dakota  1991 
Ohio  1973 
Pennsylvania  1978   
State  Year of Repeal 
South Carolina  1985 
South Dakota  1977 
Tennessee  1981 
Texas  1985 
Utah  1973 
Virginia  1975 
Vermont  1982 
Washington  1966   
 
States were excluded from the sample for the following reasons: 
 
Laws decided at the city/county level, and/or information on local laws not available (20 states): Alaska, Alabama, 
Arkansas, Connecticut, Delaware, Georgia, Hawaii , Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Michigan, Mississippi, 
Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Jersey, North Carolina, Oklahoma, and Rhode Island. 
 
Laws added exceptions over time, making it unclear in any year the extent to which the laws constrained activities 
(6 states):  Illinois, Massachusetts, Maine, New York, West Virginia, Wisconsin 
 




                                                 
† The main regressions in the paper are similar if these states are included (see text).  
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Table 2:  Means of Selected Variables for Each Dataset 
General Social Survey 
Variable  Regression Sample 
Attendance   4.38 
(2.56) 
Age  46.1 
(17.9) 
Sex (1= female)  0.58 
(0.49) 
Standard deviations in parentheses.  Observations:  11,720. The regression sample includes Catholics and 
Protestants, and excludes respondents surveyed the year a state repealed its laws.   For the basic results attendance is 
measured by an index (see text). 
 
Consumer Expenditure Survey 
Variable  Regression Sample 
Religious Giving (dollars)    434 
(1142) 
Religious Giving (logged dollars)  6.10 
(1.46) 
Dummy for religious Giving  0.40 
(0.50) 
Nonreligious Giving (dollars)  133 
(457) 
Nonreligious Giving (logged dollars)  4.7 
(1.55) 
Dummy for Nonreligious Giving  0.40 
(0.49) 
Standard deviations in parentheses.  Observations: 29,104 except for the logged variables, there observations equal 
11,615 for non religious giving and 11,725 for religious giving.  Excludes the year a state repealed its laws. 
 
National Longitudinal Survey of Youth, 1979 
Variable  Regression Sample 
Had 6+ drinks at once in past month  0.33 
(0.47) 
Used Marijuana past month (1 = Y)  0.11 
(0.31) 
Used Cocaine in past month (1 = Y)  0.02 
(0.13) 
Age  24.7 
(4.4) 
Sex (1 = female)  0.54 
(0.50) 
Standard deviations in parentheses.  Observations:  22,470, except for the marijuana and cocaine responses 
(available in 1984, 1988, 1992 and 1994); those observations are 12,318.  Excludes the year a state repealed its laws.  
See Part V of the text for more information on the sample of observations used for the NLSY.  
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Table 3:  Church Attendance: Basic Index 
 





Repeal Dummy  -0.209  -0.35  -0.222 
  [0.092]  [0.121]  [0.088] 
Placebo Dummy  -  -  0.023 
      [0.146] 
Age  0.014  0.014  0.014 
  [0.010]  [0.010]  [0.010] 
Age squared   0.001  0.001  0.001 
  [0.001]  [0.001]  [0.001] 
Dummy for Female  0.676  0.678  0.676 
  [0.034]  [0.032]  [0.033] 
Dummy for White  -0.313  -0.305  -0.313 
  [0.208]  [0.211]  [0.207] 
Dummy for Black  0.468  0.48  0.468 
  [0.261]  [0.265]  [0.261] 
Dummy for Some College  -0.434  -0.434  -0.434 
  [0.044]  [0.043]  [0.044] 
Dummy for High School  -0.741  -0.745  -0.741 
  [0.058]  [0.058]  [0.058] 
Dummy for Drop Out  -1.273  -1.28  -1.273 
  [0.108]  [0.109]  [0.108] 
Dummy for Married  0.517  0.518  0.517 
  [0.064]  [0.064]  [0.064] 
State Percent Black  -0.067  0.363  -0.063 
  [0.136]  [0.174]  [0.152] 
State Percent Foreign Born  -0.003  -0.142  -0.003 
  [0.025]  [0.185]  [0.049] 
Rate of Insured Unemployment  -0.002  -0.001  -0.006 
  [0.048]  [0.062]  [0.064] 
Disposable Income per-capita  -0.007  0.056  -0.002 
  [0.062]  [0.093]  [0.029] 
Time Trends?  No  Yes  No 
Observations  11720  11720  11720 
R-squared  0.09  0.09  0.09 
Robust standard errors in brackets. Regressions with time trends include linear and quadratic time trends 
for each state.  All regressions include state dummies and year dummies. Dependent variable is measure 
of how often an individual attends church, ranging from 0 (never) to 8 (multiple times a week).  The 
repeal dummy is set to unity once a state repeals its blue laws.  The “Placebo dummy” is set to unity two 
years before the blue laws changed.   Data are from the GSS.  
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Table 4:  Blue Laws in the GSS: Extensions 
 
 
Panel A:  Regressions on Each Attendance Level Individually. 
 
More Than 
Weekly  Weekly 
About 
Weekly 











Repeal Dummy  -0.004  -0.035  0.002  -0.002  -0.01  0.019  0.021  0.004 
  [0.010]  [0.014]  [0.011]  [0.013]  [0.008]  [0.009]  [0.008]  [0.006] 
Each column represents a separate regression.  Coefficients are from a linear probability regression.  In the first column, the dependent variable equals unity if 
an individual attends church more than weekly.  In the second column the dependent variable equals unity if an individual attends weekly, and similarly for all 
the other categories.  Regressions include all the regressors shown in Table 3. 
 
 
Panel B:  Church vs. Non Church Membership 




Repeal Dummy  -0.041  0.01 
  [0.023]  [0.016] 
Time Trends?  No  No 
Observations  6323  6323 
R-squared  0.1  0.14 
The dependent variable in the second column equals unity if a respondent is a member a non-church organization such as fraternal orders, political 
clubs, sports clubs or hobby clubs.  The sample size is somewhat smaller than before because this variable is not available in all years, and because this 
variable is missing for some of the observations used in Table 3. Regressions include all the regressors shown in Table 3. 
 
  
  33 
 
Table 5:  Blue Laws and the CEX 
 
 
Without Time Trends 
  Religious Giving  Other Giving 
  Total Giving  Log of Giving  Giving Dummy  Total Giving  Log of Giving  Giving Dummy 
Repeal Dummy  -109.9  -0.133  -0.019  46.51  0.073  0.001 
(state/year clusters)  [47.78]  [0.080]  [0.023]  [16.21]  [0.068]  [0.027] 
(state clusters)  [95.17]  [0.101]  [0.053]  [14.35]  [0.045]  [0.01] 
Time Trends?  No  No  No  No  No  No 
Observations  29104  11725  29104  29104  11615  29104 
R-squared  0.09  0.16  0.09  0.07  0.17  0.11 
 
 
With State Time Trends 
  Religious Giving  Other Giving 
  Total Giving  Log of Giving  Giving Dummy  Total Giving  Log of Giving  Giving Dummy 
Repeal Dummy  -129.45  -0.081  0.0177  31.02  0.096  -0.028 
(state/year clusters)  [83.08]  [0.156]  [0.035]  [27.12]  [0.124]  [0.043] 
(state clusters)  [74.96]  [0.18]  [0.046]  [30.44]  [0.087]  [0.050] 
Time Trends?  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations  29104  11725  29104  29104  11615  29104 
R-squared  0.09  0.16  0.10  0.07  0.17  0.11 
Standard errors in brackets.  Regressions include controls for age, age squared, gender, race, educational attainment, marital status, state percent 
black, state percent foreign born, inflation-adjusted per-capita disposable income, the statewide rate of insured unemployment, and dummies for 
interview month.  Data include 12 states over the period 1980-1998 (see text).  Regressions omit observations in states the year that blue laws 
changed.     
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Table 6:  Blue Laws and Total Church Expenditures 
 
Panel A:  All denominations together 
  No Membership 
Control   Basic  w/Trend  w/Placebo 
Repeal Dummy  -0.063  -0.059  -0.059  -0.07 
  [0.020]  [0.028]  [0.018]  [0.026] 
Placebo Dummy  -  -  -  0.019 
        [0.041] 
Control for Log of Membership?  No  Yes  Yes  Yes 
State Time Trends?  No  No  Yes  No 
State-by-Denomination Dummies?  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year-by-Denomination Dummies?  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations  1381  1381  1381  1381 
R-squared  0.91  0.92  0.96  0.92 
Each column represents a different regression. 
 
  Panel B: Dropping each denomination from the sample 
  No Membership 
Control   Basic  w/Trend  w/Placebo 
No Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod  -0.064  -0.056  -0.074  -0.071 
  [0.021]  [0.033]  [0.019]  [0.028] 
No Southern Baptist Convention  -0.031  -0.019  -0.051  -0.042 
  [0.029]  [0.034]  [0.026]  [0.028] 
No United Church of Christ  -0.073  -0.068  -0.067  -0.077 
  [0.020]  [0.028]  [0.021]  [0.028] 
No United Methodist Church  -0.055  -0.055  -0.066  -0.069 
  [0.021]  [0.020]  [0.021]  [0.024] 
  Each cell represents a different regression.   
 
Dependent variable is log of total church expenditures, per member.  Regressions are weighted by church membership. Regressions include state percent 
black, state percent foreign born, inflation-adjusted per-capita disposable income, and the statewide rate of insured unemployment.  All regressions use 
state-by-denomination and year-by-denomination dummies.  Regressions omit observations in states the year that blue laws changed.  The unit of 
observation is all the churches in a given denomination, in a given state and year.   
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Table 7: Blue Laws and Risky Behavior 
 
Panel A:  Simple Difference-in-Difference Estimates 
  Drinking  Marijuana  Cocaine 
Repeal Dummy  0.015  0.032  0.022 
  [0.017]  [0.013]  [0.008] 
Observations  22470  12318  12318 
R-squared  0.14  0.07  0.02 
 
Panel B:  Blue Laws’ Effect by Attendance 
  Drinking  Marijuana  Cocaine 
Attendee*Repeal Dummy  0.055  0.107  0.036 
  [0.012]  [0.030]  [0.020] 
State Dummies?  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year Dummies?  Yes  Yes  Yes 
State-by-Year Dummies?  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Full Set of Individual Controls?  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations  22470  12318  12318 
R-squared  0.14  0.07  0.02 
In the drinking regressions, dependent variable is unity if respondent has had six or more drinks in one sitting in past 30 days.  In 
marijuana and cocaine regressions, dependent variable is unity if respondent has ever tried marijuana in the past 30 days and 
cocaine in the last 30 days, respectively.  Drinking data are available for the years 1982, 1983, 1984, 1985, 1988, 1989, and 1994.  
Marijuana and cocaine data are available in the years 1984, 1988, 1992 and 1994.   Attendees make up about 80 percent of the 
entire sample.  A not-interacted dummy for attendees is also included in all of the above regressions. Regressions omit 
observations in states the year that blue laws changed.  Standard errors are clustered at the state level. Regressions include 
controls for age, age squared, gender, race, educational attainment, and marital status 








All Years  Marijuana  Cocaine 
Attendee*Repeal Dummy  0.046  0.097  0.037 
  [0.014]  [0.029]  [0.021] 
Married*Repeal Dummy  -0.005  0.025  -0.003 
  [0.020]  [0.011]  [0.006] 
College Graduate*Repeal Dummy  -0.005  0.019  0.008 
  [0.019]  [0.029]  [0.005] 
Woman*Repeal Dummy  0.041  0.054  -0.02 
  [0.028]  [0.025]  [0.005] 
Black*Repeal Dummy  0.036  -0.014  0.015 
  [0.027]  [0.026]  [0.007] 
State Dummies?  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year Dummies?  Yes  Yes  Yes 
State-by-Year Dummies?  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Full Set of Individual Controls?  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations  22470  12318  12318 
R-squared  0.14  0.07  0.02 
Standard errors in brackets.  Data is from the NLSY; see Table 7 for more details  
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Figure 1:  Timing & Distribution of Blue Laws 
 
 
Only one state (Iowa) repealed its blue laws in the 1950s, and only one state (North Dakota) repealed its laws in the 1990s. See Table 1 for more 
details. 
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